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THE ORGANIZED BAR: A CATALYST FOR 
COURT REFORM 
Paul R.J. Connolly* 
Throughout the past decade court reformers have been searching 
for a system of procedural rules which will help courts minimize both 
the delay and the expense of litigation. Over the last two years, Kentucky 
courts have experimented with rules which cut trial court delay by over 
fifty percent and substantially reduce the time lawyers spend exercis-
ing procedural rights. 1 Encouraged by the favorable results of this 
experiment, 2 the Kentucky Supreme Court has ordered that these rules 
be gradually implemented in all Kentucky trial courts of general 
jurisdiction. 
The Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court, John Palmore, 
was the key figure behind both the rule-making and implementation 
stages of the Kentucky reform process; the organized bar's role in this 
process was minimal. The Kentucky Bar Association had no part in 
making or implementing the new rules and local bar association involve-
ment was modest and ad hoc. The active involvement of Justice Palmore 
was partially due to the requisites of Kentucky law - the Kentucky 
constitution vests exclusive rule-making authority with the Supreme 
Court3 - and partially to the Chief Justice's strong interest in trial 
court reform and his concomitant willingness to take control of the 
reform process. In most states, however, there is unlikely to be some-
• Assistant Staff Director, ASA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay. A.B., 
1967, Assumption College; J.D., 1974, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I. For a comprehensive discussion of the Kentucky reforms, see Connolly & Planet, Con-
trolling the Caseflow - Kentucky Style, 21 JUDGES' J. 8 (1982). This article concludes that the 
Kentucky Rules should form the structure for other trial court costs and delay reduction pro-
grams. Assuming ample judicial resources and the absence of statutory constraints, a caseflow 
management program (based on the Kentucky caseflow principles) can be crafted for any trial 
court or trial judge in a way that will substantially duplicate the success of the program in Ken-
tucky. Id. at 59. 
2. Connolly and Planet report that the Kentucky Rules resulted in less delay, with the average 
case subject to the Kentucky Rules closing 11 months earlier than under normal procedures; 
lower attorneys' fees because judicial control over the discovery process reduced discovery formality; 
a faster pace of litigation, prompting settlements earlier in the process and savings in time lawyers 
spent on procedural matters, resulted in savings to clients paying by the hour and by flat fees; 
and lower court costs. The amount of time that judges spent per case was not increased, because 
a reduction in hearings on motions offset the increase in conference activity. Quality of justice, 
measured by trial preparation time and settlement figures, was not affected. See generally id. 
3. KY. CONST. §§ II, 116. 
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one like Justice Palmore having 60th the constitutional authority to 
effect major trial court reforms, and the personal commitment to achieve 
them. To the extent that these states wish to duplicate Kentucky's suc-
cesses, they cannot fail to make the bar an integral element of the 
court reform process. 
Some state bar associations have been integrated into the judicial 
legislation process by the legislature or the courts deeming them to 
be continuing commissions on judicial administration. The state bar 
is often made a partner of the courts in the effort to minimize the 
cost and delay of resolving disputes. Because government, including 
the judicial branch, serves the public best when held accountable by 
dispassionate outsiders, oversight of court operations and stimulating 
the policy-making phase of reform are fundamental necessities. Neither 
the legislative nor the executive branch can perform these functions 
nearly as effectively as the bar. Yet, a survey of state chief justices 
revealed that few believe their bar associations currently have a signifi-
cant impact on rule making. 4 One obvious reason for this is that one 
third of all state bar associations do not have a committee responsible 
for administration of civil justice issues. s Many of these states have 
unified bars, like the Kentucky Bar Association, that have not been 
empowered by state government to act as commissions on judicial 
administration. 6 And though voluntary bars have no such legislative 
impediments - indeed, state and local bars rarely have active commit-
tees to study and oversee the administration of civil justice - the survey 
nonetheless suggests that their contributions to court reform have been 
minor. 
This Article theorizes that state and local bar associations can play 
a vital role in ridding their courts of excessive costs and delay. Theory 
can become practice, however, only if state and local bars are reorgan-
ized to broaden their oversight and lobbying functions, in order to 
make them more effective vehicles of reform. 7 This Article, then, 
4. See C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RuLEMAKING IN THE STATE COURTS 
249-56 (1978). The survey revealed that only 420Jo of the chief justices deemed the state bar's 
contribution "very significant," 280Jo thought the bar's contribution was "moderately signifi-
cant," IOOJo thought it was "slightly significant," and 200Jo believed it was "not significant." 
5. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF BAR ACTIVITIES 18 (1980). Only 190Jo of the 
bar groups had a committee with some responsibility for reducing litigation costs and only 430Jo 
had a similar committee working for delay reduction. 
6. A unified bar has two essential features: (I) as a condition of Ii censure all lawyers are 
required to be dues-paying members; (2) the bar association is created by court rule or legisla-
tion. A voluntary bar is a private, voluntary membership entity. Nineteen states have no unified 
bars. Of the remaining 33 states (including the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico) with unified bars, four also have voluntary bar associations. American Bar Associa-
tions, 1980-81 Directory Bar Associations 33 (Chicago, 1980). 
7. Currently, the ABA Action Commission is attempting to gain insights into the validity 
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discusses the role the organized bar can and should play in achieving 
procedural reform that will reduce the delay and cost of litigation. Part 
I describes the various stages of the reform process, using the Ken-
tucky experiment as a model, 8 and outlines the contributions that can 
be made by bar associations at each stage. Part II sets out a structural 
model for bar associations that will enable the organized bar to become 
an effective and efficient court reform agent. 
I. THE BAR'S ROLE IN THE REFORM PROCESS 
As evidenced by the Kentucky experiment, the process of revising 
procedural court rules entails two rather broad phases, each comprised 
of several distinct steps. First, those involved with the reform effort 
must identify the specific areas in which reform is needed, and develop 
rules that will best respond to the problems identified. Once this policy-
making stage is completed, reformers must have an effective means 
to implement these rules. At both the policy-making and implementa-
tion levels of the reform process, the organized bar's role is crucial. 
A. Policy-Making 
Making judicial policy to effect court reform involves three discrete 
steps. First, those advocating reform must encourage judicial 
policymakers, whether the judicial or legislative branch, to acknowledge 
that reform is necessary. Second, reformers must analyze the problems 
that are most pressing and explore all alternative ways of resolving 
them. Finally, rules must be formulated that are responsive to these 
problems. 
1. Acknowledgement- The most serious obstacle to achieving pro-
cedural reform at the trial court level may be the judiciary's failure 
to recognize the serious consequences of the cost and delay of litiga-
tion. In Kentucky, such judicial myopia was not a problem. Chief Justice 
Palmore of the Kentucky Supreme Court had become concerned that 
delay and costs were forcing state policy-makers to consider alternative 
methods of dispute resolution, and that classic adjudication was not 
being given a chance to prove its effectiveness. Even without the en-
couragement of the organized bar, Chief Justice Palmore was willing 
to experiment with rules of practice that would hasten dispute resolu-
tion by requiring trial judges to supervise attorneys' conduct of litigation. 
of this theory. A survey is being conducted of several state bar associations detailing bar activity 
and organization in promoting court reform. The study will focus on political strategies that 
have aided bar-promoted court reform, as well as common barriers to successful reform efforts. 
8. Much of the description of the Kentucky reform process that follows is based on the author's 
personal observations. A report documenting this material is available from the author. 
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Few other chief justices, however, have shown a similar interest in 
moving their trial court systems along the path to comprehensive docket 
reform. 9 This suggests that, even though the judicial branch is often 
authorized to modify, and is at least partially responsible for modify-
ing rules that govern courtroom procedures, lodging independent rule-
making power in the judicial branch will not alone guarantee that the 
need for court reform will be perceived by the judiciary. 
Indeed, the inherent quiescence of many rule-making bodies coupled 
with a concentration of rule-making power in the judicial branch may 
well increase the possibility that cost and delay problems will not be 
acknowledged by the judicial officers of most states. 
In these states, the impetus for change must come from outside the 
judiciary. The executive and legislative branches, due to inadequate 
technical staffing, partisan politics, and competing priorities, cannot 
be relied upon to press for major trial court reforms. State bar associa-
tions on the other hand, are particularly suited to this task. In Lathrop 
v. Donohue,1° the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state 
bar association could be deemed to be an office of state government, 
operating inter alia as a continuing commission on the state of judicial 
administration. 11 State bar associations, therefore, could fulfill an 
important governmental role by apprising judicial policy-makers of the 
problems of trial court costs and delay, and lobbying the appropriate 
rule-making body to consider enduring solutions. 
2. Analysis- Analyzing possible solutions to the problems of litiga-
tion delays and costs is a necessary predicate to forming policy - the 
alternative is uninformed decision making. In Kentucky, Chief Justice 
Palmore carefully studied how other state judicial systems were attempt-
ing to reform their trial courts. He was persuaded that procedural rules 
could be crafted to reduce the costs and delay attendant to Kentucky 
litigation. He decided that the best way to counteract rules slowing 
the pace of litigation and encrusting the process with needless procedure 
would be to experiment with rules embodying the concepts _of total 
9. A notable exception was the late Chief Justice C. William O'Neill of Ohio, who pushed 
actively for criminal and civil docket reform through Ohio's Rules of Superintendence. By dint 
of his energy and interest in docket reform, many Ohio trial courts reported some reduction 
in delay, primarily for their criminal dockets. Ohio's failure to adopt rules governing caseflow, 
as Kentucky did, however, has resulted in a retrogression since his death. See generally Grave 
& Cheskin, Ruling Out Delay: The Impact of Ohio's Rules of Superintendence, 66 JUDICATURE 
109 (1982). 
Some chief justices have stimulated or actively supported reforms of the structure of state 
court systems, such as centralizing administration and unifying trial courts. See Lowe, Unified 
Courts in America: The Legacy of Roscoe Pound, 56 JUDICATURE 316-23 (1973). Arguably, unifica-
tion is a precondition to effective docket reform. 
IO. 367 U.S. 820 (1960). 
II. Id. at 828-33, 848. 
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case management 12 and active judicial control. 13 These concepts were 
endorsed in 1974 by the American Bar Association (ABA), 14 and their 
validity has since been confirmed by research conducted by the Na-
tional Center for State Courts (NCSC) 15 and the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC). 16 Rules were_ drafted that placed lawyers and judges on a time 
schedule for every phase of litigation so that the typical case would 
reach trial in six months. 
Chief Justice Palmore delegated to his Administrative Office the tasks 
of site selection, rule drafting, administrative planning, and evalua-
tion, but made himself accessible when the stature of his office would 
enhance the experiment's credibility. Most importantly, he personally 
tracked the progress of the experiment throughout the eighteen month 
trial period. The draft rules subjected courts to certain temporal con-
straints, and Chief Justice Palmore appreciated the need to monitor 
the administration of the rules during the experimental phase of the 
program. Consequently, members of his Administrative Office 
periodically collected data reflecting rule compliance. These results were 
reported to Chief Justice Palmore, and when he noted scheduling 
breakdowns, he contacted the appropriate chief circuit judge regarding 
the need to modify internal calendaring procedures. 
At the end of the eighteen-month trial period, when most of the 
cases subject to the experimental rules had been closed, Chief Justice 
Palmore ordered an assessment of the impact of the rules on the prac-
tice of law and the administration of justice. An analysis of the find-
ings, prepared by the American Bar Association, was forwarded to 
the Chief Justice in June of 1982, and rule-making soon followed. 
Trial court administration is a quickly changing field and experimen-
tation or field testing in a court environment is a highly technical area 
and may require greater expertise than most state bar associations have 
available. At the analysis stage, though, the state bar served an impor-
tant oversight function by commenting on site selection, and on the 
12. The total case management concept entails case management over each case from filing 
of the matter to disposition, settlement, dismissal, or trial. See generally Sipes, The Journey 
Toward Delay Reduction in Trial Courts: A Traveler's Report, STATE CT. J., Spring 1982, at 4. 
13. The active judicial control concept envisions the judge exercising his inherent and explicit 
power to govern the procedural development of a case, in place of the adversaries exercising 
perceived prerogatives to move the case along at their pace. 
14. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON STANDARDS 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1976). 
15. See T. CHURCH, E. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGA· 
TION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); L. SIPES, A. CARLSON, T. TAN, A. AIKMAN & R. PAGE, 
MANAGING TO REDUCE DELAY (1980). 
16. See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE 
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); P. CONNOLLY & P. LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS 
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980); 5. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT 
MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1978). 
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drafting of the experimental rules, and by soliciting support for the 
experiment's objectives from the local bar. Moreover, judicial research 
often has a low budget priority; state bars can help fund such research. 
3. Rule Making- Persuaded by the favorable findings, Chief Justice 
Palmore and Justice Stephens, a colleague on the Supreme Court and 
ultimate successor as Chief Justice, persuaded fellow members of the 
court that the experimental rules should be adopted as the official rules 
of practice for Kentucky. Decision making was prompt and decisive; 
by September 1982, the new rules were adopted and ordered to be 
implemented in the civil dockets of Circuit Courts. 
The relative speed with which the experimental rules replaced the 
old court rules may partially be a consequence of the independent rule-
making authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court. A more bureaucratic 
rule-making process - one like the federal process, which is layered 
with committees and involves the legislature to a significant degree -
undoubtedly would have retarded promulgation of the rules. Moreover, 
the independent nature of Kentucky's rule-making process may have 
created an environment that abetted Chief Justice Palmore's efforts 
towards a comprehensive court reform program. The efficiency of the 
mle-making aspect of the reform effort in Kentucky, however, appears 
to owe more to the leadership and skills of the Chief Justice and his 
predisposition to effect change in the trial courts than to the nature 
of Kentucky's rule-making process. 
In many states the process of rule making involves the state bar in 
a variety of roles, usually in an advisory capacity. To the extent that 
the state bar has been following the reform process from the recogni-
tion stage, its advice to the judicial policy-making body at the rule-
making stage should flow as a matter of course even though the bar 
does not have a formal role in the rule-making process. Thus, when 
the state bar has been excluded from the reform process by the judiciary, 
it should comment on the proposed reforms even if its views are not 
officially considered by the rule makers. 
B. Implementation 
The act of rule making does not by itself cure systemic court prob-
lems; promulgation of new rules does not automatically change prac-
tice, nor does it immediately produce expected results. On the con-
trary, implementing new rules entails a host of potential pitfalls, each 
of which can defer change or frustrate reform. Successful procedural 
reform involves two stages: active involvement of the bar in introduc-
ing the new program, and in monitoring its performance. 
1. Introducing the program- The Kentucky -Supreme Court recog-
nized that implementation of the new rules would fail unless it developed 
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a sound implementation strategy. The new rules excepted circuit courts 
from the rules' ambit, but delegated to the Supreme Court's Adminis-
trative Office the authority to void exceptions on a court-by-court basis. 
The pace of implementation, therefore, was guided by the administrative 
arm of the judiciary, which had sufficient responsibility and authority 
to pave the way for the successful administration of the rules in the 
circuit courts. The Kentucky Supreme Court selected three initial sites, 
including the original experimental site, in which to pilot test the rules. 
The Kentucky judiciary was aware of the need to familiarize both 
the bench and the bar with the new rules. Consequently, for the bench, 
the Administrative Office conducted a workshop for the judges and 
staff personnel who would administer the new programs. At this 
workshop, the Chief Judge of the Campbell County Circuit Court, 
the experimental site, described potential implementation problems and 
judges were able to obtain answers to practical questions about admin-
istration. The clerk and caseflow manager of the Campbell County 
Circuit Court explained the monitoring and scheduling process and the 
new court forms developed for the program. For the bar, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court scheduled a workshop for lawyers practicing in 
each of the two new court sites. Members of Campbell County's bench 
and bar gave presentations on the background and objective of the 
programs, its rules, and the impact of these rules on practice in Camp-
bell County. An open-ended question and answer period followed the 
presentations. Chief Justice Palmore and Chief Justice-elect Stephens 
participated in all three workshops. By attending, the two justices con-
firmed the judiciary's confidence in the program and its commitment 
to the rules' successful implementation. 
The process of introducing the rules also entailed an extensive analysis 
of the host court's management system and resource needs. This analysis 
is crucial. In Kentucky, for example, one of the host circuits covered 
four counties, each of which maintained a holding court. In such cir-
cumstances, if the discovery and final pretrial conferences had been 
conducted in the presiding judge's chambers with counsel present, the 
cost in travel time might have offset savings from reduced procedural 
formality under the rules. Conducting the conferences on the telephone 
has been demonstrated to be an effective substitute for personal 
appearance/ 7 and so the Administrative Office furnished the par-
ticipating circuits with the equipment, budget, and training necessary 
to conduct the conferences over the telephone. Without such pre-
introduction analysis, administration of the rules might have resulted 
in no cost savings to litigants. 
17. See generally CHAPPER & HANSON, PHASE I EVALUATION OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCING 
TO CONDUCT MOTION HEARINGS IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1982). 
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Here again, the bar's role should primarily be one of oversight. 
Because procedural rules cannot address significant shortcomings in 
resources and court management, the state and local bar should take 
steps to ensure that these implementation problems are squarely ad-
dressed by local judges, court administrators, and the legislature. 18 
The state bar association might ask the administrative office of the 
courts to draft an implementation plan for each court site. The local 
bar could then review the plan with an eye towards insuring that 
resources and docketing issues are addressed, as well as and.other court 
management problems expected to constrain reform. 
2. Monitoring Program Administration- Determining whether im-
plementation has successfully minimized court costs and delay will con-
tinue to be a judicial function in Kentucky. The Supreme Court's 
Administrative Office has developed a system to monitor the administra-
tion of the program by which certain milestone events in the progress 
of program cases will be statistically analyzed. The resulting informa-
tion has both operational and research potential. Sample data can be 
periodically collected and studied by the Administrative Office staff. 
If patterns of blockages in the movement of cases surface, the ad-
ministrative office can alert the judge to the problems. 
The local bar has a special interest in insuring that the local bench 
continues to implement the master plan faithfully, and the state bar 
can help facilitate this monitoring function. 
Because the local bar would be unable to detect the level of adherence 
and evaluate the effectiveness of the plan without access to the Ad-
ministrative Office statistics, the state bar should lobby for local bar 
access to the statewide judicial information system. Additionally, the 
state bar should supply the local bar with the analytic expertise to open 
and sustain an effective dialogue between the local bench and bar. Final-
ly, where local problems are unsolvable because their causes are rooted 
in state policy, the state bar should consider exerting lobbying pressure 
on appropriate governmental bodies. 
II. BAR ORGANIZATION 
Presently, most bar associations are incapable of serving as effec-
tive reform agents. They are typically limited both structurally and by 
their varied perceptions of the bar's role in the reform process. For 
example, the bar's role in judicial administration reform is often 
IS. See generally Baar, The Scope and Limits of Court Reform, 5 JusT. SYS. J. 274 (1980). 
Reform is essentially a political process. To effectuate change state bar associations must be 
prepared to lobby state government entities, whether judicial or legislative, to obtain the resources 
and management results that are needed to implement the rules. 
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perceived by both the bench and the bar as reactive. This limits reform 
efforts to bench initiatives. Lawyers tend to focus on specific rules 
to cure perceived practice problems, but this myopia ignores systemic 
causes of cost and delay, such as the failure of trial judges to take 
control over their dockets and trial calendaring. Few lawyers have the 
technical know-how needed to analyze docket delay and expense 
problems, and state bar staffs usually cannot make up for this lack 
of expertise. This places the bar at a disadvantage in maintaining an 
intelligent dialogue with the bench. Bar politics may also be a factor 
limiting the bar's role; the outcome of the race for the state bar 
presidency rarely is based on a candidate's views on judicial administra-
tion reform. Absent a presidential priority favoring court reform, the 
responsible committee, even if there is one, will not get the financial 
assistance needed to take up the issue of court reform. 
With some critical changes in philosophy and organization, though, 
state and local bar associations could assume a role comparable to that 
played by Chief Justice Palmore. A few state bar associations, such 
as the Connecticut Bar Association, have begun taking more active 
part in the reform process. 19 These bar groups share a number of 
characteristics. For example, they tend to be headed by a bar leader-
ship that financially and politically supports a comprehensive and 
durable effort to reduce court costs and delay, and that is willing to 
commit its time and resources to comprehensive court reform plan-
ning and efforts. Within the bar organization itself is a judicial or civil 
committee that works with the judiciary to effect court cost and delay 
reform and sponsors ongoing problem-raising sessions with the bar 
membership. Often, these bar associations employ a court reform con-
sultant and a professional lobbyist. The former assists the committee 
in locating cost and delay problems and suggests solutions. The latter 
is responsible for monitoring legislative activities affecting both bench 
and bar, and for mobilizing legislative support for reform efforts. Most 
have both an education program with a high priority placed on pro-
moting an understanding of the special role of the bar in the justice 
system, improving the quality of advocacy, and reducing litigation 
abuses, and a disciplinary system that searches out patterns of abuse 
in state or federal litigation, and punishes lawyers and law firms engaged 
in such abuse. 
These bar organizations serve as a model. By incorporating some 
or all of these features, bar associations can enhance their role in the 
crucial effort towards reducing court delays and costs through pro-
cedural reform. 
19. See Quade, Let's Talk, 9 BAR LEADER 26 (1983). The author points to the bench-bar com-
munication gap as an impediment to court reform, and cites examples where state bars have 
successfully attempted to narrow that gap. 
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CONCLUSION 
To overcome judicial inertia towards reforming the courts, state and 
local bar associations must recognize the need to make court reform 
a priority and structure themselves to discharge this undertaking. Because 
the judiciary is unlikely to encourage the creation of a reform-oriented 
bar, the bar ultimately must assume the responsibility for sensitizing 
lawyers to the need to engage in such activity, and for organizing the 
association's oversight and policy-making functions. By actively engaging 
in such reform-oriented measures, the bar can play a central role in 
achieving the procedural reform necessary to reduce the delay and cost 
of litigation. 

